The Indian aviation sector is on a tear, growing faster than almost any other large market on earth. In 2025 we will carry roughly 220–230 million domestic passengers — more than triple Australia’s ~60 million and closing in on one-third of America’s ~800 million. Yet the market structure is bizarrely concentrated:

• Australia (60 million domestic passengers) → effective duopoly (Qantas Group + Virgin)
• India (220+ million domestic passengers) → even tighter duopoly (IndiGo 63–64 %, Air India Group 28 %)
• United States (800+ million domestic passengers) → four healthy majors (Delta, United, American, Southwest) each with 15–25 % share

India today has almost four times Australia’s traffic volume but a more concentrated industry than Australia ever had. And only a tiny fraction of our 1.4 billion people fly regularly — meaning the real boom is still ahead of us. When that boom arrives, relying on essentially two airline groups (one of which has 63–64 % share) is not just inefficient. It is a national infrastructure risk.

Here’s the complete domestic market share picture (DGCA data, averaged March–November 2025):

Airline / Group	Market Share	Notes
IndiGo	63–64 %	Low-cost juggernaut, 2,000+ daily flights
Air India Group (AI + Vistara + AIX)	~28 %	Tata’s full-service conglomerate
Akasa Air	5–5.5 %	Fastest-growing #3, 200+ aircraft on order
SpiceJet + Alliance Air + others	< 4 %	Mostly regional or struggling

That’s it. Three meaningful players. One crisis at the 63 % gorilla and the entire country grinds to a halt — exactly what happened in the first week of December 2025 when IndiGo cancelled 2,500+ flights because it ran its pilots on razor-thin rosters and couldn’t absorb the new DGCA fatigue rules (weekly rest up from 36 to 48 hours). When one company can unilaterally shut down half the nation’s flights, we no longer have a competitive market — we have a single point of failure.

That episode wasn’t just bad PR. It was proof that over-reliance on a single dominant player is now a national infrastructure risk.

The Akasa Experiment: The First Serious Challenger in Fifteen Years

Since Jet Airways died in 2019, every new entrant has either

• gone bankrupt (GoFirst),
• become a zombie (SpiceJet), or
• stayed tiny and regional (Fly91, Star Air, Flybig).

Akasa Air, launched in August 2022, is the first one that actually looks like it has solved the “how to survive in India” puzzle.

What they are doing differently — and brilliantly:

1. Single aircraft family only 100 % Boeing 737 MAX. Same type rating, same spares pool, same maintenance procedures. The multi-type chaos that bled Kingfisher and Jet dry simply does not exist.
2. Obsessive reliability Akasa has ranked #1 or #2 in on-time performance almost every single month since launch. In a country where flights are late by default, OTP is a superpower.
3. Youngest, greenest fleet in India Average aircraft age < 2 years. The MAX burns ~20 % less fuel than the CEO/neo mix most competitors still fly → permanent cost advantage.
4. No legacy debt, no ego projects No unrelated hotels, no Formula-1 teams, no premature wide-bodies. Just disciplined, boring, profitable growth.
5. Ambitious but phased expansion 226 firm orders + purchase rights for another 124. Goal: 15–18 % domestic share by early 2030s — enough to become a genuine third pole.

Must read: The ONE Reason behind the downfall of Kingfisher Airlines

If Akasa gets there, India finally moves from “fragile duopoly” to “robust triopoly” — and the market becomes dramatically more resilient.

The Structural Headwinds Nobody Can Wish Away

Even the best-run airline cannot escape India-specific pain points:

• Aviation Turbine Fuel (ATF) is taxed at 15–35 % state VAT → Indian carriers pay 40–60 % more than Dubai or Singapore competitors. Fuel = 40–45 % of total costs.
• Pilot supply bottleneck: India produces only ~1,000–1,200 new type-rated pilots per year against a requirement of 2,000+. This hard ceiling protects the big two more than any other moat.
• Metro slot & night-parking congestion at Delhi, Mumbai, Bengaluru, Hyderabad is essentially frozen.
• Pratt & Whitney engine crisis has grounded 30–50 aircraft across the industry for the last 18 months.

The One Thing Only Passengers Can Fix

Government can (and is) building 100 new airports under UDAN. But only Indian travellers can stop the ₹60,000–80,000 crore annual leakage of high-margin international revenue to Gulf and Turkish carriers.

Every time you choose Emirates to London, Qatar to New York, or Turkish to Los Angeles because the one-stop fare is ₹8,000–12,000 cheaper, you are actively financing the growth of a rival hub while starving Indian carriers of the only place they actually make money: long-haul international.

Those fat-margin international cash is what lets IndiGo and Air India Group

• absorb domestic price wars,
• hire the next 500 pilots,
• induct wide-bodies, and
• survive the next operational crisis without cancelling half the country’s flights.

A Simple, Strategic Ask

Next time you search for a ticket, make it a conscious vote:

• Domestic short-haul → IndiGo or Akasa (pick whichever is more reliable that day)
• Tier-2/3 or regional → Akasa, Fly91, or the new Air Kerala
• Long-haul international → Air India Group or IndiGo’s growing wide-body network

Your ticket is capital allocation. It is infrastructure investment. It is nation-building disguised as a booking confirmation.

India finally has a credible, well-run third airline that is doing almost everything right. Let’s not wait for the next IndiGo-style meltdown to prove why we needed it all along.

Fly Indian — not out of sentiment, but out of cold, hard strategy.

Because the sky above India should belong to India. ✈️

Thank you for reading. Please share this post with your friends and family who might consider this while flying next time.

Also read:

• The ONE Reason behind the downfall of Kingfisher Airlines