The recent meltdown at India’s largest airline, leading to thousands of cancellations, was a systemic failure—not just an operational blunder by a single carrier. While IndiGo’s lean staffing model was the immediate trigger, the Ministry of Civil Aviation (MoCA) and the Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) are the bigger culprits.
The narrative that pins the blame solely on the “63% gorilla” ignores the fact that the gorilla was operating within a cage designed and supervised by the government.
1. The Roster Approval and the Regulatory Blind Spot
Flight rosters are not unilateral creations by airlines; they are governed by the Flight Duty Time Limitations (FDTL) regulations, which are mandated by the DGCA.
- Airline Submits Plan: Every airline must submit its operational schedule and crew-rostering procedures to the DGCA for approval, ensuring compliance with FDTL norms.
- DGCA Oversight: The DGCA’s Directorate of Flight Safety (DFS) and Directorate of Air Safety (DAS) are tasked with overseeing the implementation of these safety regulations.
The Core Failure: Approving an Unsustainable System
The chaos did not start when the new rules hit; it started when the DGCA approved the original schedule for the winter season knowing the new, stricter FDTL Phase II rules were looming.
The allegation is not that IndiGo lied, but that the DGCA, the safety regulator, failed in its primary role:
- Lack of Proactive Audit: The DGCA approved a lean roster system that relied on razor-thin margins and minimal crew buffers. They should have proactively audited the airlines’ readiness, demanding proof of adequate crew reserves before the new rules (weekly rest increase from 36 to 48 hours) took effect.
- Permission to Fail: The DGCA approved the schedule with the caveat that the new rules would be implemented. When the airline failed to meet the resource requirement—a clear safety lapse that turned into an operational disaster—the DGCA granted temporary exemptions for operational stabilization. This shows a reactive, politically motivated response rather than proactive enforcement.
The Ministry, as the supervising body of the DGCA, is responsible for this regulatory leniency and lack of foresight.
2. The Ministry’s Role in Enforcement and Regulation
The Ministry of Civil Aviation (MoCA) cannot simply pass the buck to the DGCA. The DGCA is an attached office of the MoCA.
| Entity | Primary Role | Failure in the Recent Crisis |
| MoCA (Ministry) | Policy & Oversight. Responsible for the overall formulation of national aviation policy and exercising administrative control and ultimate superintendence over the DGCA. | Policy Follow-up Failure: Did not ensure the DGCA enforced FDTL rules robustly or demand transition plans, allowing the risk to escalate into a national crisis. |
| DGCA (Regulator) | Safety & Enforcement. Responsible for the enforcement of air safety, airworthiness standards, and licensing. | Enforcement Failure: Approved unsustainable roster models and was reactive (issuing show-cause notices after the chaos) rather than preventative (auditing crew reserves before the rules took effect). |
The Minister’s responsibility lies in the political and administrative supervision of the regulator. The failure to prevent the crisis is a direct failure of MoCA oversight.
3. Policy Support: High Entry/Survival Costs
The Aviation Minister’s repeated assertion that “India has space for at least five airlines” is an empty truism. The core problem is that the Ministry of Civil Aviation (MoCA), through inaction and structural negligence, maintains the high barriers that prevent more than two major players from surviving, effectively nurturing the fragile duopoly it claims to deplore.
The duopoly exists only because the Ministry allows the costs to remain catastrophically high, filtering out any serious competition.
1. The Single Largest Barrier: The ATF Tax Black Hole
Indian carriers pay 40–60% more for fuel than global competitors, and this is entirely due to government policy. Fuel accounts for over 40% of an airline’s total operating costs—a massive burden that keeps airlines perpetually near the break-even point and deters new entrants.
The Ministerial Failure to Act
The question is simple: What has the Ministry done to reduce this tax burden?
The MoCA’s failure is administrative and political:
- Central Excise Duty: The MoCA has the direct power to influence the Central Excise Duty on ATF, yet this component of the tax remains significant.
- State VAT Harmonization Failure: The MoCA has only offered requests to states to reduce VAT. It has repeatedly failed to use its political leverage to enforce a universal, low rate, effectively ceding its authority to individual state treasuries who prioritize short-term revenue over national aviation policy.
The Cost of State Revenue Greed
The states charging the highest VAT are doing so for “cheap money” at the cost of airline sustainability.
Tamil Nadu with 29% tops the list of states taxing the aviation fuel, West Bengal with 25% comes second and Maharashtra with 18% comes third. Why? All other states have 1-5% taxes. What is so special in Tamil Nadu and West Bengal?
The Ministry is well aware of this data, yet it has failed to create the necessary policy mechanism (like bringing ATF under GST) to override this destructive conflict of interest.
2. The Paradox of Air Fare Regulation
The government and the public are simultaneously keen on getting flights “cheaper and cheaper” while expressing surprise when airlines bleed capital and go bankrupt. This is a contradictory approach that ignores basic economics.
The Minimum Fare Debate
If the goal is airline sustainability, the Ministry must address its paradoxical regulatory stance:
- Maximum Cap, No Minimum Cap: The Ministry is quite keen on imposing maximum price caps during periods of high demand to protect the consumer, yet it vehemently refuses to institute a minimum price cap.
- Why a Minimum Cap is Needed: A minimum floor for ticket prices would prevent airlines from destroying their own balance sheets with suicidal price wars—a strategy often employed by dominant players to bleed out new entrants like Akasa Air. Just as farmers and other sectors can demand a minimum support price, airlines need a sustainable floor to ensure they can invest in maintenance, adequate crew reserves, and fleet upgrades.
The Ministry’s refusal to allow airlines to capture necessary profit margins—through structural tax relief or a minimum fare floor—makes the survival of new airlines dependent on luck and deep pockets, ensuring the duopoly remains structurally invincible.
Conclusion: Resignation and Political Commentary
The recent, catastrophic meltdown—from the June tragedy of Air India Flight 171, which claimed hundreds of lives, to the current nationwide chaos of mass cancellations—reveals a terrifying truth: India’s aviation sector is not under control. It is not an isolated incident concerning one over-leveraged private airline; it is a systemic failure of the Ministry of Civil Aviation and the DGCA.
The Minister and the authorities under him are paid handsomely for continuous vigilance, not for reactive press conferences. The public is entitled to ask: Why are you literally warming your chairs? What measurable, preventative action were you taking before the crisis hit?
- You are paid to audit preparedness: The DGCA’s job is to ensure airlines have the crew reserves, the maintenance buffers, and the financial stability to absorb shocks. Your approval of a razor-thin roster, knowing the strict FDTL rules were pending, was an act of regulatory negligence.
- You are paid to solve structural problems: The Ministry has the political capital to rationalize the crippling 40%+ ATF tax—the single biggest barrier to new airline entry and sustainable survival. Yet, you have failed for years to override the “revenue greed” of a few states, preferring to request change rather than enforce policy.
- You are paid for safety first: The Air India crash, alongside multiple near-misses and technical breakdowns, points to a deeper malaise within the Directorate General of Civil Aviation. The regulator is designed to be independent; its failure to prevent catastrophe suggests a fundamental compromise of safety standards.
The Minister’s defense—that he is merely holding the dominant player accountable—rings hollow. While the action is necessary, the timing is political. When a crisis exposes the system’s fragility, the Ministry rushes to punish the firm while quietly maintaining the structural tax and regulatory environment that enables the duopoly in the first place.
This is not governance. It is a terrifying return to policy paralysis and the appearance of regulatory capture—the very hallmarks of the UPA-era ministries that the current government was elected to dismantle.
The NDA leadership must never forget that they rose to power on the promise of effective governance and competence. If the aviation sector, a pillar of the ‘New India’ economic story, is allowed to crumble due to administrative inertia and a reactive regulator, then the entire reform narrative is compromised.
The chaos demands more than fines and show-cause notices. It demands Ministerial Accountability. The time for the current Minister to demonstrate true leadership, or resign and allow a complete, high-level structural inquiry into the regulatory body, is now. India’s skies, and its passengers, deserve nothing less than an aviation system built on competence, not political expediency.
Thanks for reading!
Also read:
Infinite Sea of Opportunities 